How states make their own air pollution somebody else’s problem by Monogan III, James E. et al.
1/5/2017
How states make their own air pollution somebody else’s
problem
blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2017/01/05/how-states-make-their-own-air-pollution-somebody-elses-problem/
For now, one of the unfortunate byproducts of an industrial economy is air pollution, but states can
often reap the beneﬁts of industry and production while forcing other states to bear the costs. In a
new study of tens of thousands of air polluters in the US, James E. Monogan III, David M.
Konisky, and Neal D. Woods ﬁnd that air polluters are more likely to be located near a downwind
border compared to solid waste polluters; in eﬀect, making air pollution another state’s problem.
American states have long accused their neighbors of dumping their pollution onto them. These
accusations date at least as far back as 1907’s Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. case, when the
state of Georgia successfully argued before the US Supreme Court that copper smelters in
Tennessee were located in a position such that pollution would pose problems for forests, orchards,
and residents’ health in the Peach State. Contemporary evidence suggests that there is merit to
these kinds of claims: Major air polluters in the continental United States tend to be
disproportionately close to individual states’ downwind borders.
Major air polluters such as power plants, airports, hospitals, and factories generate economic and
ﬁscal beneﬁts for the state in which they are located. However, the pollution that these sites emit—
substances like sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and particulate matter—pose hazards to the
environment and health risks for the downwind residents who breathe polluted air. Given the
prevailing wind direction at a certain location, then, there is a strategy by which the state can reap
the economic beneﬁts of production without incurring the costs of pollution: If the sites of these air
polluters are located near downwind borders, then the wind carries the pollution and all of its
associated problems into downwind states. In other words, states have strong incentives to engage
in free-riding behavior that is helpful to the individual state itself, but possibly harmful to the nation as a whole.
Prior studies on air pollution have found conﬂicting results on whether states engage in this free riding behavior. On
one hand, there is evidence that levels of pollution tend to be higher near state borders, but on the other there is
little evidence that states are lax in their regulatory oversight of polluters near these borders. Our study suggests
that states may engage in free riding behavior earlier in the process by encouraging polluters to locate near
downwind borders. A disproportionate number of air polluters near a border would lead to added pollution, even if
regulations were enforced evenly throughout the state. In addition, ﬁrms themselves have incentives to locate near
downwind borders. By locating in places whether the pollution primarily aﬀects residents of other states, companies
reduce the risk of eﬀective organized political opposition, because out-of-state residents lack legislative
representation and face other administrative and legal barriers.
To determine whether air polluters are particularly likely to be near downwind borders, we studied the location of
16,211 major air polluters and 20,536 generators of hazardous solid waste across the continental United States.
These two types of facilities are similar in terms of their locational needs (proximity to population centers,
transportation infrastructure, bodies of water, and so on) and the fact that the pollution they produce can pose
environmental and health risks. The major diﬀerence is that the wind will carry away air pollution, but it will not carry
away solid waste pollution. Hence, this is an ideal comparison that allows us to assess whether air polluters are
more likely to be located near a state’s downwind border than a group of similar industrial facilities.  As an example
of what these data look like in a single state, the ﬁgure below shows a map of the state of Georgia, distinguishing
hazardous waste generators as white dots and major air polluters as black crosses.
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Figure 1 – Air polluters and hazardous waste generators in Georgia
Using a technique called point pattern analysis, we ﬁnd that air polluters in the continental United States are indeed
more likely to be located near a downwind border than hazardous waste generators. On average, moving from a
downwind border to the location farthest from the state’s downwind border diminishes the odds of an air polluter
relative to a solid waste polluter by 22.4 percent. Even moving from the downwind border to a site that is only one-
tenth as far away will produce a 2.5 percent drop in the odds of an air polluter relative to a solid waste polluter.
Therefore, air polluters are more likely to emerge near downwind borders than they are to emerge in the interior of a
state. Additional analysis indicates that this eﬀect is even more pronounced for facilities with highly toxic air
emissions.
Our results are strong evidence that air polluters are strategically located at more downwind sites.  They cannot tell
us, however, whether this is primarily the result of state government decisions (to encourage air polluting facilities to
locate near downwind borders) or ﬁrm decisions (to locate near downwind borders (in order to minimize the
eﬀectiveness of “Not-in-My-Back Yard” political opposition).  Our supplementary analyses indicate that the extent of
free riding behavior that we observe within a state is correlated with a variety of state-level factors in ways that
suggest that both of these processes may be at work. These factors include the number of organized interest groups
within the state, the strength of its environmental policy, and its degree of reliance on “smokestack chasing”
economic development strategies.
These ﬁndings are important to consider as the federal government debates policies such as the Environmental
Protection Agency’s Cross-State Air Pollution Rule. That rule was designed in recognition that pollutants from
upwind states can blow into downwind states and sought to impose limits on upwind states. Considering this rule in
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the case of EPA v. EME Homer City Generation in 2014, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg upheld the EPA’s provision,
arguing that “the emitting or upwind State reaps the beneﬁts of the economic activity causing the pollution without
bearing all the costs”.  Our results suggest that this issue may pose a substantial problem for current and future
eﬀorts at environmental protection in the United States.
This article is based on the paper, ‘Gone with the Wind: Federalism and the Strategic Location of Air Polluters’ in the
American Journal of Political Science.
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